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This paper is to provide quantitative data on some critical issues in anticipation of the forthcoming 
international negotiations in Denmark on the control of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Instead of 
letting only a small number of countries dominate a few controversial dialogues about emissions re-
ductions, a comprehensive global system must be established based on emissions allowances for 
different countries, to realize the long-term goal of controlling global atmospheric CO2 concentrations. 
That a system rooted in “cumulative emissions per capita,” the best conception of the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” principle affirmed by the Kyoto Protocol according to fundamental 
standards of fairness and justice, was demonstrated. Based on calculations of various countries’ cu-
mulative emissions per capita, estimates of their cumulative emissions from 1900 to 2005, and their 
annual emissions allowances into the future (2006―2050), a 470 ppmv atmospheric CO2 concentration 
target was set. According to the following four objective indicators―total emissions allowance from 
1900 to 2050, actual emissions from 1900 to 2005, emissions levels in 2005, and the average growth rate 
of emissions from 1996 to 2005―all countries and regions whose population was more than 300000 in 
2005 were divided into four main groups: countries with emissions deficits, countries and regions 
needing to reduce their gross emissions, countries and regions needing to reduce their emissions 
growth rates, and countries that can maintain the current emissions growth rates. Based on this pro-
posal, most G8 countries by 2005 had already expended their 2050 emissions allowances. The accu-
mulated financial value based on emissions has reached more than 5.5 trillion US dollars (20 dollars 
per ton of CO2). Even if these countries could achieve their ambitious emissions reduction targets in 
the future, their per capita emissions from 2006 to 2050 would still be much higher than those of de-
veloping countries; under such circumstance, these future emissions would create more than 6.3 tril-
lion US dollars in emissions deficits. Because of their low cumulative emissions per capita, most de-
veloping countries fall within one of the latter two groups, which means that they have leeway for 
making emissions decisions in the future. Although China accounts for more than 30% of the total 
global emissions allowance from 2006 to 2050, its total emissions can be controlled within that allow-
ance by no other way than reducing its future emissions growth rates. In the end, nine key issues re-
lated to international climate negotiations were briefly addressed. 
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1  Introduction 
In light of the fact that average global temperatures have 
increased by 0.74℃ in the past 100 years, the interna-
tional community now generally accepts the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report’s conclusion that further dis-
cernible human-induced warming of the Earth, averaged 
over each continent, is likely[1]. The debate on the causes 
of global warming, however, remains―and, due to the 
highly complex nature of climate systems, the short his-
tory of systematic scientific observations of the Earth, 
the lack of reliable means to assess the causes of past 
climate changes, and the limitations in our capacity to 
make reasonable predications of future trends, such de-
bate will continue for a long time into the future. Thanks 
to the extraordinary efforts made by some key groups of 
people around the world, a growing awareness of the 
importance of controlling greenhouse gas emissions has 
been observed both among the general public and at 
policymaking levels, where international cooperation 
will increasingly dominate political and diplomatic rela-
tions if rational solutions to control global atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations below a certain threshold 
are to be developed in the future. Indeed, on this issue 
no country can sit aside.  
Control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be 
achieved by numerous means, such as reducing total 
energy use, transforming energy infrastructures, limiting 
population growth rates and so on. Fundamentally, 
however, the issue of emissions controls boils down to 
economics and social development, especially in relation 
to the adjustment and reallocation of interests between 
different countries, different industrial sectors, and dif-
ferent communities. Emissions controls, therefore, will 
continue to prove a particularly sensitive and complex 
one. As might be expected, under the current framework 
of international relations, which was formed to protect 
national economic and social interests, a consensus on 
the allocation of responsibilities for controlling these 
emissions has been difficult to reach, to say the least, 
and fierce competition between nations vying for their 
state rights will continue to make such a consensus dif-
ficult to reach. Worryingly, countries from different in-
terest groups appear to be trying to shirk their responsi-
bilities; finger pointing is sure to be prevalent at the 
forthcoming international negotiations on reducing fossil 
energy use in Copenhagen. In response to these past and 
projected difficulties, we propose that in order to meet 
scientifically established targets for controlling atmos-
pheric GHG concentrations, the top priority must be 
both to develop a rigid international system of emissions 
responsibility that is endorsed by all countries and to 
design a roadmap with clearly defined targets for fulfill-
ing this responsibility. 
By now, various proposals to reduce greenhouse 
gases emissions have been developed by different inter-
national researchers[1―6], each of which could be viewed 
as part of a comprehensive system of international re-
sponsibility. If these proposals are analyzed in detail, 
three major weaknesses would emerge. First, the theo-
retical basis in most of these proposals for the determi-
nation of reduction responsibilities among countries is 
weak, incapable of providing a stable enough foundation 
to support the forthcoming international negotiations on 
controlling atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Secondly, 
although in most proposals for reducing emissions dif-
ferent targets for controlling GHG concentrations and 
emissions reduction responsibilities of major countries 
are established, these targets provide neither quantitative 
estimates for future CO2 emissions allowances from 
global human activities nor detailed analyses of whether 
these CO2 concentration control targets can even realis-
tically be achieved after major countries have fulfilled 
their emissions reduction responsibilities. Finally, while 
many of these proposals discuss the responsibility of 
reducing GHG emissions, few mention the right of 
emissions, which can be defined as the right of different 
countries to emit different amounts of greenhouse gases 
over a certain period of time. In general, the interna-
tional community has agreed that a “cap and trade” sys-
tem is the best way to achieve emissions reductions in 
order to control atmospheric CO2 concentrations under a 
certain level, but to effectively realize the goals of “cap 
and trade”, allowances must first be equitably allocated 
among countries before emissions can be effectively 
regulated through international trade. For each country, 
this allowance is its greenhouse gas emissions right. 
In this paper, the emissions allowances of all coun-
tries are calculated at a target of CO2 concentration be-
low 470 ppmv by 2050, in order to provide a quantita-
tive basis for the forthcoming international climate 
change negotiations. The anticipated difficulties for 
achieving the “470 ppmv goal” are also analyzed based 
on the projected emissions for the countries.  
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 2  CO2 concentration target of 470 ppmv 
Under the current knowledge of the climate systems, it 
is difficult to determine a “best” atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations to control at a certain time because of several 
uncertainties: (1) sensitivity of atmospheric temperature 
to CO2 concentrations; (2) adaptability of human socie-
ties and ecosystems to temperature changes; (3) endur-
ance of human societies faced with increasing tempera-
tures; (4) gross energy demand in the context of steady 
population growth and socio-economic development; (5) 
energy infrastructure changes in major energy consum-
ing countries; and (6) rates of technological innovation 
and dissemination of new technology around the world. 
The “2℃ threshold”[1,7], now widely known in the 
international community as the temperature ceiling 
above which global changes could be devastating, is 
understood simply as a basis for assessing the sensitivity 
of atmospheric temperature to CO2 concentrations. This 
is an important distinction because, currently, the inter-
national scientific community does not possess reliable 
means to quantitatively separate the human-made from 
the natural effects of global warming over the past cen-
tury. For example, since 1906 the global average tem-
perature has increased by 0.74℃. Atmospheric CO2 
concentrations since that year have increased by about 
82 ppmv, while other greenhouse gases have increased 
by about 60 ppmv of equivalent CO2 concentrations. If 
calculations are shifted to begin in 1880, however, CO2 
concentrations are then estimated to have increased by 
89 ppmv, but the average temperature increase has only 
been about 0.6ºC[8]. What this indicates is that choosing 
different beginning times in evaluating the sensitivity of 
temperature to CO2 concentrations―1906 and 1880, in 
this example, respectively―can lead to quite different 
conclusions.  
Although the capacity for using numerical models to 
forecast climate systems has greatly improved over the 
past 30 years, the simulations derived from even the 
world's most advanced models are still highly uncertain. 
For example, in simulating the rise of surface tempera-
tures caused by a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations from 280 ppmv, results from different global 
models indicate a rather broad range, from a manageable 
1℃ increase to a disastrous 6℃ increase[8]. In fact, the 
widely quoted estimate of a 2.5℃ surface temperature 
increase caused by a doubling of atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations is actually just the average of simulation re-
sults from various models. What this means is that the 
“2℃ threshold” claimed by some researchers as corre-
sponding to certain atmospheric CO2 concentrations is 
actually little more than conjecture, a guesstimate lack-
ing sufficient scientific basis to be referenced without 
qualification. The fact is that the sensitivity of atmos-
pheric temperatures to CO2 concentrations will remain a 
challenge for the international scientific community for 
years to come. 
Despite such great scientific uncertainty, however, 
few now deny the reality of the greenhouse effect and 
the need to control greenhouse gas concentrations[9,10]. 
The difficulty remains in exactly how to determine a 
target concentration. To make a rational calculation, full 
consideration must be given to three points: (1) in the 
immediate future, humans will have to use a large quan-
tity of fossil energy before renewable and clean tech-
nologies can be brought online as major sources of en-
ergy; (2) despite limitations agreed to by signers of the 
Kyoto Protocol, CO2 emissions per capita of developed 
countries have remained very high and their overall 
emissions are still increasing, which demonstrates how 
difficult reducing CO2 emissions is; and (3) for devel-
oping countries to achieve their goals of poverty allevia-
tion and economic development, fossil energy consump-
tion will grow steadily in these countries unless signifi-
cant external financial aid and assistance in acquiring 
and maintaining advanced technologies are provided in 
the coming decades.  
In this paper, the target atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion is set at 470 ppmv for 2050, a number determined 
by the following consideration: If the average annual 
growth rate of atmospheric CO2 is controlled at its cur-
rent growth rate of 2 ppmv, then, since atmospheric CO2 
was 385.57 ppmv in 2008, atmospheric CO2 would 
reach about 470 ppmv in 2050. Given that the Earth’s 
population is expected to increase from its current 6.5 
billion to around 9.1 billion[11] by 2050 and that global 
economic and social development will continue to ac-
celerate in many regions, energy use per capita can be 
assumed to increase accordingly, so 470 ppmv is actu-
ally quite a challenging target for the world as a whole 
to control its CO2 concentrations. 
3  Extent of global emissions from 2006 
to 2050 
With target concentrations determined, total CO2 emis-
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 sions by human activities through the consumption of 
fossil fuels until the year 2050 can now be calculated. 
Given the accessibility of various data, 2005 has been 
set as the starting year for this calculation. Since atmos-
pheric CO2 totaled 379.75 ppmv in that year[12], an in-
crease of only up to 90.25 ppmv over the 45 years 
(2006―2050) will enable us to meet the 470 ppmv tar-
get.  
To make the calculation, concentrations should first 
be converted to mass. According to atmospheric density, 
the mass of 1 ppmv CO2 is equal to about 1.52 ppm. 
Since the total mass of the atmosphere is about 5.12 × 
1015 t[13], if atmospheric CO2 concentrations increase by 
1 ppmv, the quantity of increased carbon will be about 
1.52×10−6 × (12/44) × 5.12 × 1015 = 2.12 × 109 t, or 2.12 
GtC. Accordingly, an increase of CO2 concentrations by 
90.25 ppmv would result in 191.33 GtC of CO2 being 
added into the atmosphere. A big portion of the emitted 
CO2 would eventually be absorbed by oceans and terres-
trial ecosystems; from 2000―2006, the annual average 
rate of this absorption was 54%[14]. Assuming that this 
rate remains constant into the future, total emissions into 
the atmosphere in 2006―2050 can be 415.93 GtC 
(191.33/0.46).  
Most CO2 emissions from human activities result 
from two major activities, the burning of fossil fuels and 
land use patterns. According to data from CDIAC[15], 
CO2 emissions from land use have had little inter-annual 
change over the past 50 years, ranging only from 1.25 to 
1.70 GtC, with a mean of 1.48 GtC from 1998 to 2007. 
If CO2 emissions from land use are assumed to be 1.50 
GtC every year for the 2006―2050 period, then total 
emissions from land use over those 45 years would be 
67.50 GtC. To meet the 470 ppmv target, therefore, the 
total CO2 emissions permitted from the burning of fossil 
fuels is 348.43 GtC, which is equivalent to 1277.58 bil-
lion tons of CO2 emissions from 2006 to 2050. 
4  Allocation of emissions quotas in the 
future 
If the international community agrees to set a target CO2 
concentration of 470 ppmv for 2050 (hereafter, the 470 
ppmv target), then one significant issue remains: How to 
allocate that 348.43 GtC emissions limit among different 
countries around the world.  
Because “fairness and justice” are the foundations of 
good social governance, a premise soundly articulated in 
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” princi-
ple of the Kyoto Protocol, our belief is that emission 
quotas allocated according to a “cumulative emissions 
per capita” standard could truly be both fair and just to 
all citizens of the world. Cumulative Emissions Per 
Capita (CEPC) is here defined as the sum of annual 
emissions per capita in a country or region for a certain 
period of time. By this definition, two figures―a coun-
try's total population and its total annual CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels consumption―are sufficient to calcu-
late CEPC values. CEPC was used first by some Chi-
nese scholars[16,17], based on the concept of “cumulative 
emissions”[18] originally proposed by the Brazilian gov-
ernment. 
Calculations in this paper are based on the annual 
CO2 emissions of countries with populations over 
300,000 as derived from the United States Carbon Di-
oxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)[19], which 
has estimated the annual CO2 emissions from 1751 to 
2005 of countries around the world. Because these esti-
mates indicate that atmospheric CO2 concentrations in-
creased by only about 19 ppmv from 1751 to 1899, we 
have chosen the year 1900 as the baseline for our analy-
sis. Annual population data of different countries was 
calculated based on two data sets: Population data from 
1900 to 1949 was derived from the website Populstat[20] 
(if country data was missing for a particular year, then a 
multi-year population average was used); for the 1950 to 
2005 period, population data was derived from the 
United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2006 
Revision[21]. GDP data from the World Bank since 1960 
was also used in making calculations for several coun-
tries[22].  
By analyzing these data, the conclusion that CO2 
emissions is a fundamental right of living and develop-
ment is not difficult to make; thus, the international 
community should subscribe to the principle that, 
henceforth, all countries are entitled to equal cumulative 
CO2 emissions allowances based on scientifically estab-
lished estimates of future emissions. The legitimacy of 
this conclusion is demonstrated by the four figures that 
follow. 
The correlation analysis between cumulative CO2 
emissions per capita (CEPC) from 1900 to 2005 of 
countries with populations greater than 300000 and the 
per capita GDPs of those countries in 2005 is shown in 
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 Figure 1. The 27 European Union countries, the 49 least 
developed countries and the Small Island Union (38 
countries) are combined as one data point. The average 
of 12 non-EU former Soviet Republics, which had much 
larger carbon emissions before independence than in the 
post-independence period, is also combined as one data 
point. As Figure 1 indicates, the CEPC of each country 
over the study period has quite a high correlation with 
that country's current per capita GDP, demonstrating that 
accumulated fossil fuel consumption over the period of 
analysis closely correlates to current levels of national 
wealth.   
 
Figure 1  The relationship between cumulative emissions per capita from 
1900 to 2005 and per capita GDP in 2005. 
 
Figure 2 shows annual changes of CEPCs and per 
capita GDP from 1960 to 2005 in six representative 
countries. Among these, the United States (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Japan, Canada, and France rep-
resent highly developed countries; China represents a 
developing country. Overall, the developed countries’ 
CEPCs were very high even by 1960 (US = 234.48 tC, 
UK = 177.17 tC, Canada = 149.49 tC, and France = 
73.56 tC). For China, on the other hand, the CEPC was 
only 24.14 tC for the entire period from 1900 to 2005, 
which is nearly the same value as the US and UK CEPC 
in only the first eight years of the period (1900 to 1907). 
Additionally, per capita GDP in China in 2005 still had 
not reached the per capita GDP that each of the repre-
sentative developed countries had already surpassed by 
1960. Although Japan’s CEPC was only 22.31 tC in 
1960, its CEPC, corresponding to its rapid economic 
development, had nonetheless increased by 4.16 times to 
115.10 tC by 2005. Figure 2, like Figure 1, plainly illus-
trates a consistent trend: an increase in a country’s  
 
Figure 2  The relationship between per capita cumulative CO2 emissions 
and per capita GDP from 1960 to 2005 in six representative countries. 
 
CEPC directly corresponds to economic growth in that 
country. 
Figure 3 shows trends in CO2 emissions per capita 
since 1900 in five developed countries. Two distinct 
characteristics are evident. First, each developed country 
underwent at some time a rapid growth period of per 
capita CO2 emission (5.04% in the US from 1901―1910; 
9.89% in Germany from 1947―1957; and 11.98% in 
Japan from 1960―1970, for example). Second, CO2 
emissions per capita for each developed country in Fig-
ure 3 eventually peaked during the study period (in 1973 
in the US, in 1971 in the UK, and in 1979 in Germany 
and France). After peaking, emissions in each country 
either declined slightly or remained unchanged; ironi-
cally, these developed countries’ emissions declines or 
stabilizations could be linked to the relocation of their 
high-energy, high-emissions industries to developing 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s.  
The conclusion clearly drawn from Figures 1―3 is 
that during the phase when a nation engages in major 
industrial development, it inevitably goes through a pe-
riod, which usually corresponds to a large number of 
infrastructure construction projects and rapid urbaniza-
tion, when its CO2 emissions per capita peak. Figure 3 
also suggests that even after this peak, achieving emis-
sion reductions is not an easy task. For example, the 
growth of annual emissions per capita in Japan remained 
at 1% from 1990 to 2005. Another fact worth pointing 
out is that the annual emissions per capita in the US in 
1900 had already reached 2.37 tC, while in the UK 
emissions were already as high as 3.24 tC at that time. 
Based on data from the International Energy Agency 
(IEA)[23], energy consumption patterns in 2006 of China, 
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Figure 3  Changes in CO2 per capita emissions in five developed countries. 
 
India, France, Germany, and the US are compared in 
Figure 4. In 2006, the proportion of industrial energy 
consumption (including manufacturing and construction) 
in China was 43.80% of total energy consumption; the 
proportion of consumption for people’s personal liveli-
hoods and transport was only 38.87%. In contrast, those 
two patterns of consumption in the US accounted for 
17.85% and 57.51% of the total, respectively. As far as 
energy consumption per capita in 2006, the US averaged 
5.19 (one ton standard oil per capita); Germany aver-
aged 3.07; France averaged 2.84; again contrastingly, 
China and India only averaged 0.91 and 0.33, respec-
tively. Finally, transport energy consumption per capita 
in the US in 2006 averaged 2.13 tons standard oil, 2.34 
times the total energy consumption per capita in China.  
 
Figure 4  Patterns of energy consumption in five countries. 
 
The primary inference drawn from Figure 4 is that 
there are significant differences between developing and 
developed countries not only in energy consumption per 
capita but also in the patterns of total energy consump-
tion. The most logical explanation for these differences 
is that CO2 emissions from the world’s developing 
countries, those that are at a phase of mid-development 
like China and India, are primarily from industrialization, 
while emissions from transport and people’s livelihoods 
in these countries remain quite low overall. Conversely, 
the high CO2 emissions per capita in developed coun-
tries are closely linked with consumer lifestyles that are 
pervasive in those countries. The difference here is cru-
cial, indicating that developed countries enjoy tremen-
dous emissions reduction potential through basic life-
style choices, while, on the other hand, the possibilities 
for developing countries to achieve reductions will re-
main very low for a long time into the future if their 
citizens are to realize the prosperity that development 
promises. 
Indeed, as these four figures demonstrate, the best 
way to ensure application of the fundamental social 
principles of “Fairness and Justice” in the process of 
coordinately controlling global atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations is by applying the principle of CEPC in al-
locating future global emissions quotas.  
Using CEPC as a global index, emissions allowances 
from 1900 to 2050 for countries with populations greater 
than 300000 in 2005 were calculated for three past and 
one future period: 1900―1949, 1950―1989 and 
1990―2005 and 2006―2050, respectively. For the past 
periods, global emissions per capita were calculated by 
dividing each year’s global CO2 emissions (based on the 
burning of fossil fuels) by the global population in that 
year. Emissions allowances were then determined by 
multiplying the total population of each country by 
global per capita emissions. Finally, by subtracting the 
annual emissions allowance for each country by its ac-
tual emissions, “emissions surpluses” or “emissions 
deficits” for each country for specific periods could be 
determined. For the future period (2006 to 2050), alter- 
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 natively, emissions allowances for different countries 
were based on the global population in 2005; to avoid 
intractable complexities; differences in population 
growth rates for different countries were not included in 
the calculations. The total projected per capita allowance 
of annual emissions for the 45-year future period is 1.19 
tC ((348.43×10/65.15)/45), or 4.36 tCO2. Using this 
limit, future emissions allowances for different countries 
could then be obtained by multiplying it by the 2005 
population figures for individual countries. 
Based on these calculations, each country’s emissions 
quotas for the period from 2006 to 2050 could be readily 
determined by subtracting their allowances from 1900 to 
2050 by their actual emissions from 1900 to 2005. Pre-
dictably, by considering both population sizes and past 
actual emissions, emissions allowances between coun-
tries differ significantly.  
Based on four objective indicators―1) due emis-  
sions allowance between 1900 and 2050; 2) actual emis-
sions from 1900 to 2005; 3) emissions in 2005; and 4) 
the average growth rate of emissions during the 1996 to 
2005 period―countries with populations greater than 
300000 could be categorized into four groups, as illus-
trated in Tables 1―4.  
The 30 countries in Table 1 have overall emissions  
“deficits". They are mainly well-developed or major oil 
producing countries, including the US, the UK, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The total popula- 
tion of these countries in 2005 was 928 million, being 
14.25% of the global total. According to the CEPC index, 
these countries have already over-emitted by 88.59 GtC. 
More specifically, the total emissions allowance of the 
United States for the entire period from 1900 to 2050 is 
calculated as 31.63 GtC, but it had already reached this 
total by 1963. Similarly, the UK, Germany, Canada, 
Australia, and France, based on these calculations, had 
 
Table 1  Countries with emissions deficits (units: MtC) 
1900―1949 1950―1989 1990―2005 2006―2050 
Countries 
Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Allowances Quotas 
US 21411.64  2832.75  41149.41 8023.79  23359.27 4736.02  16037.06  −54290.69 
Germany 6207.24  1614.98  9993.13 2884.98  3657.56 1392.78  4420.59  −9544.61 
UK 6312.09  1091.79  6373.04 2077.90  2411.95 997.95  3222.16  −7707.27 
Russia 1538.44  2346.38  13547.89 4938.34  6858.15 2517.73  7699.23  −4442.80 
Canada 1116.67  233.10  3256.92 820.52  2049.15 511.64  1725.99  −3131.50 
Australia 369.52  145.50  1612.41 486.21  1408.35 317.30  1086.27  −1355.00 
Poland 1141.46  621.93  3263.36 1245.97  1426.69 654.72  2042.89  −1266.00 
Belgium 862.58  193.20  1168.20 360.89  444.25 173.05  556.13  −1191.77 
Ukraine 513.12  841.67  4861.94 1773.96  1781.75 847.46  2509.38  −1184.34 
Czech Republic 571.43  243.72  1343.15 374.16  546.40 174.91  545.11  −1123.07 
France 2243.46  965.23  3919.96 1915.33  1596.52 1001.91  3262.06  −615.41 
Kazakhstan  95.19  150.97  1363.14 486.19  735.20 265.83  813.55  −476.99 
Slovakia 186.09  79.07  625.40 173.18  183.84 91.36  288.12  −363.60 
Netherlands 397.60  183.75  1150.31 492.24  617.46 267.34  873.29  −348.75 
United Arab Emirates 0.00  2.17  211.51 22.79  394.56 49.34  219.50  −312.28 
Denmark 172.35  82.55  504.16 184.79  234.76 90.04  289.72  −264.16 
Kuwait 2.89  1.69  200.19 35.48  246.05 36.43  144.41  −231.12 
Qatar 0.07  0.44  76.88 6.44  152.31 10.12  42.57  −169.69 
Belarus  99.53  161.38  940.82 343.17  321.25 172.51  523.88  −160.65 
Luxemburg 0.06  6.80  116.63 12.99  41.34 7.18  24.44  −106.61 
Saudi Arabia 33.03  56.22  732.29 285.08  1259.95 335.82  1262.87  −85.28 
Estonia 14.44  21.78  142.50 51.85  81.21 24.26  71.88  −68.37 
Brunei 8.87  0.80  33.30 5.51  24.35 5.37  20.00  −34.84 
Lithuania  37.23  55.97  329.10 119.62  82.38 60.82  183.18  −29.11 
Georgia 48.84  71.94  489.75 177.80  57.73 83.73  239.24  −23.62 
Austria 303.79  163.77  471.83 279.45  271.26 137.36  443.49  −22.80 
Latvia 30.94  49.75  244.74 89.24  49.54 41.82  123.12  −21.29 
Sweden 210.66  148.82  668.09 301.27  213.96 150.58  483.39  −8.65 
Moldova  38.14  61.31  376.82 135.68  68.78 71.94  207.36  −7.46 
Finland 30.24  84.70  354.57 175.07  243.39 87.52  280.58  −0.34 
Total 43997.61 12514.13 99521.44 28279.89 50819.36 15314.84 49641.46 −88588.07 
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 Table 2  Countries and regions needing to reduce their gross emissions (units: MtC) 
1900―1949 1950―1989 1990―2005 2006―2050 
Countries or regions 
Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Allowances Quotas 
Iran 35.28  310.01  939.87  1237.75  1374.04  1088.38  3712.94  3999.89  
South Korea 33.11  450.47  749.74  1229.14  1670.21  779.72  2560.30  2566.57  
Italy 383.55  978.54  2593.61  2029.82  1827.27  981.46  3136.64  2322.02  
Spain 251.31  565.71  1272.00  1298.90  1136.84  686.58  2321.06  2212.10  
Japan 1074.41  1517.84  6380.23  4037.13  5071.86  2150.04  6840.49  2019.00  
Malaysia 7.31  98.18  192.98  436.85  529.98  373.95  1372.03  1550.75  
Venezuela 43.73  78.92  760.67  450.13  600.94  396.45  1429.42  949.58  
North Korea 13.48  208.05  865.39  556.02  717.93  378.34  1263.09  808.71  
Romania 132.20  333.19  1267.25  773.49  468.74  382.27  1156.76  777.52  
Serbia  25.38  109.83  308.46  315.01  187.54  170.63  527.52  601.60  
South Africa 399.42  201.09  1866.61  918.62  1584.70  734.49  2563.99  567.45  
Greece 14.66  153.08  325.03  340.08  363.33  183.33  593.68  567.14  
Hong Kong 0.07  20.62  111.87  156.48  147.24  109.40  377.44  404.76  
Uzbekistan 87.03  126.85  1395.54  489.59  574.62  404.84  1422.31  386.40  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 11.64  53.37  135.16  136.69  69.61  64.53  209.39  247.58  
Hungary 163.92  207.21  670.49  390.21  248.47  174.82  539.44  228.81  
Switzerland 105.19  98.58  336.54  227.18  179.15  122.37  397.07  224.32  
Israel 0.44  23.55  162.18  115.27  238.52  96.96  357.92  192.56  
Bulgaria 34.42  135.20  574.18  318.63  221.56  140.06  414.24  177.97  
Libya 0.00  17.73  159.70  90.10  201.35  87.11  316.52  150.41  
Macedonia  5.36  25.70  60.17  60.93  46.43  33.80  108.79  117.25  
Slovenia 6.45  30.33  63.23  64.86  59.14  33.60  106.92  106.89  
Oman 0.00  8.01  34.90  35.63  86.32  38.35  134.09  94.85  
New Zealand 59.38  33.64  162.22  106.64  121.25  64.13  219.13  80.70  
Azerbaijan 44.01  69.49  556.99  198.06  173.83  134.81  446.70  74.23  
Ireland 61.04  85.92  203.75  119.08  163.68  63.86  221.59  61.98  
Norway 94.72  67.01  238.09  146.36  156.80  75.53  248.11  47.40  
Cyprus 0.00  8.36  20.48  22.70  25.32  12.94  44.71  42.91  
Montenegro  1.34  5.78  19.43  19.78  11.80  10.73  32.52  36.25  
Malta 0.00  5.96  8.02  12.04  11.00  6.53  21.55  27.07  
Turkmenistan 17.95  27.86  252.05  88.68  158.33  73.61  258.49  20.31  
Armenia 18.73  29.47  275.08  97.49  36.88  54.58  161.42  12.27  
Iceland 0.05  2.57  15.54  7.81  9.02  4.68  15.83  6.29  
Total 3125.58 6088.12 22977.45 16527.15 18473.70 10112.88 33532.1 21683.54 
 
all already expended their emissions allowances for the 
period from 1900 to 2050 by 1957, 1969, 1980, 1990 
and 1999, respectively. 
The countries and regions in Table 2 are those need-
ing to reduce their gross emissions. These countries and 
regions still possessed some of their emissions quotas 
after 2006, but if they maintain their 2005 levels, then 
their total emissions from 2006 to 2050 will exceed their 
total quotas. Countries and regions in Table 2, therefore, 
must reduce their emissions in the near future. These 33 
countries and regions, with a total population of 627 
million, or about 9.62% of 2005 global population, in-
clude newly developed countries and regions such as 
South Korea, Italy and Hong Kong; developed countries 
like Japan, Norway and Switzerland; and several devel-
oping countries. 
Countries and regions in Table 3 are those needing to 
reduce their rates of emissions growth. If these countries 
and regions maintain their 2005 emission levels, then 
their emissions in 2006―2050 will be less than their 
quotas; however, if their CO2 emissions growth rates 
remain the same as or increase above those of 1996―
2005, then their overall emissions will exceed their quo-
tas by 2050. This group contains 63 countries, most of 
which are developing, and has a total population of 
2.302 billion (35.34% of global population in 2005). 
China belongs to this group. 
The countries in Table 4 can maintain their current 
emissions growth rates. For these countries, if the 
growth rates of their CO2 emissions from 2006 to 2050 
remained the same as they were from 1996 to 2005, then 
their emissions would not exceed their quotas by 2050. 
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 Table 3  Countries and regions needing to reduce their emissions growth rates (units: MtC) 
1900―1949 1950―1989 1990―2005 2006―2050 Countries or 
regions Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Allowances Quotas 
China 489.28  11819.59  10283.94 32451.25  14938.58 21123.66  70223.81  109906.51  
Indonesia 84.94  1445.63  584.56 4847.97  1174.73 3488.93  12090.83  20029.13  
Nigeria 8.11  480.18  335.79 2242.85  279.28 2000.07  7560.33  11660.26  
Vietnam 35.58  443.73  156.93 1712.61  213.74 1296.70  4547.72  7594.50  
Mexico 127.85  424.46  1599.04 2111.38  1681.63 1623.96  5576.60  6327.88  
Egypt 17.60  357.53  342.90 1412.25  513.90 1087.14  3896.33  5878.86  
Turkey 44.85  368.05  576.03 1467.37  827.67 1114.74  3902.75  5404.37  
Thailand 0.16  22.37  238.79 1461.97  832.28 1005.41  3369.67  4788.19  
AOSIS 19.67  268.44  860.73 1087.50  737.40 721.15  2469.05  2928.34  
Argentina 137.35  263.61  817.11 943.34  566.71 610.57  2072.36  2368.71  
Algeria 1.99  159.83  308.54 587.60  447.10 499.51  1757.17  2246.49  
Ivory Coast 0.00  62.95  29.54 243.90  26.68 271.39  994.01  1516.03  
Syria 0.15  49.79  119.84 274.59  206.61 266.88  1010.53  1275.20  
Chile 52.34  104.11  216.68 368.97  221.36 253.26  871.53  1107.49  
Portugal 46.13  167.25  183.88 348.49  230.93 173.42  563.08  791.31  
Honduras 0.00  20.36  13.59 112.47  20.26 100.25  365.51  564.75  
Jordan 0.00  19.57  32.74 64.97  63.48 76.68  296.52  361.51  
Palestine 0.00  19.73  1.07 50.50  1.61 49.62  201.21  318.39  
Croatia 18.83  89.65  154.19 159.90  88.49 77.91  243.41  309.36  
Congo 0.00  13.30  5.82 55.93  6.40 51.26  193.08  301.34  
Lebanon 0.35  22.65  49.28 91.31  62.56 61.08  214.53  277.38  
Albania 1.96  24.05  42.31 84.63  11.98 53.81  168.69  274.93  
Panama 0.01  12.21  22.05 60.74  22.24 48.00  172.86  249.51  
Kyrgyzstan 22.70  36.19  326.15 115.58  52.74 81.54  278.33  110.06  
Swaziland 0.00  3.48  2.47 19.27  2.72 17.15  60.17  94.88  
Macao 0.00  0.71  3.12 9.22  6.63 7.26  25.30  32.74  
Total 1109.85 16699.42 17307.09 52386.56 23237.71 36161.35 123125.38 186718.12 
 
In the global effort of control atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations, these countries’ main task should be not to in-
crease their emissions growth rates. This group contains 
80 countries, including the League of the Least Devel-
oped Countries (49 countries, except Tuvalu) as well as 
a few of the world’s most populous countries (India, 
Brazil, and Pakistan); it has a total population of 2.657 
billion, or about 40.78% of global population in 2005. 
5  Expected emissions of different coun-
tries for the period 2006 to 2050 
Bearing in mind the emissions allowances in Tables 1―
4, projected emissions for each country for the period 
2006―2050 should now be estimated in order to assess 
likely total global emissions in the future. 
Several of the countries in Table 1 have previously 
proposed future emissions reduction targets, so their 
projected annual emissions are readily calculable. The 
US House of Representatives, for example, recently 
passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
(also known as the Waxman/Markey Draft Climate Bill), 
which mandates a decrease in overall US emissions, 
based on 2005 figures, by 17% in 2020 and 83% by 
2050. Based on total emissions of 1.58 GtC in 2005, and 
assuming that year to year emissions reductions in the 
US will be achieved uniformly, gross US emissions from 
2006 to 2050 is estimated at 44.63 GtC (Table 5). Like-
wise, the EU target for emissions reductions (based on 
1990 levels) is 30% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. The ex-
pected total emissions for the 16 EU countries in Table 1 
during the 2006―2050 period, therefore, is 20.69 GtC. 
Projections for selected EU country emissions in that 
same period are 6.54 GtC for Germany, 3.97 GtC for the 
UK, and 2.59 GtC for France.  
Since some countries in Table 1 have not as yet set 
reduction targets, their projected emissions are more 
difficult to estimate. These countries can be divided into 
three sub-groups: six countries with net gas exports, four 
former Soviet Republics, and the three so-called um-
brella-shaped countries (Canada, Russia, and Australia). 
For those countries with net gas exports, reducing emis-
sions may prove rather difficult. Assuming that their 
emissions will decrease uniformly by 20%, the total 
 Ding Z L et al. Sci China Ser D-Earth Sci | Oct. 2009 | vol. 52 | no. 10 | 1447-1469 1455 
 Table 4  Countries that can maintain their current emissions growth rates (units: MtC) 
1900―1949 1950―1989 1990―2005 2006―2050 
Countries 
Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Emissions Allowances Allowances Quotas 
India 579.51  7023.15 2674.55 22290.28 4516.53 17047.24  60672.79 99262.87 
Least Developed Countries Union 13.33  3603.86 454.64 12929.83 445.28 10954.56  41012.06 67587.06 
Brazil 91.51  795.07 1116.24 3836.28 1198.13 2865.78  9992.53 15083.77 
Pakistan 0.46  597.57 215.99 2524.91 420.95 2319.02  8454.86 13258.98 
Philippines  0.88  310.85 236.22 1488.77 288.73 1237.97  4522.96 7034.72 
Colombia 18.54  175.29 315.18 892.97 259.41 681.58  2403.91 3560.62 
Kenya 0.00  80.14 37.59 492.95 36.10 501.30  1903.99 2904.69 
Morocco 2.26  147.85 100.99 618.82 144.10 474.40  1631.00 2624.73 
Peru 18.69  133.66 165.59 538.90 113.98 421.04  1458.73 2254.07 
Ghana 0.00  68.20 22.59 371.38 25.34 324.69  1205.27 1921.61 
Sri Lanka 0.00  136.52 31.83 479.50 33.74 312.18  1022.67 1885.30 
Iraq 35.23  80.32 271.02 426.10 307.00 397.75  1497.35 1788.28 
Cameroon 0.00  77.27 17.76 287.58 14.80 255.59  951.75 1539.64 
Guatemala 0.03  41.27 26.38 220.67 36.13 182.18  679.79 1061.36 
Ecuador 5.83  49.17 75.92 246.34 96.84 201.15  698.56 1016.61 
Zimbabwe 25.54  27.54 66.56 223.93 65.84 206.18  701.71 1001.43 
Tunis 0.39  59.04 57.22 209.75 78.88 157.53  540.46 830.28 
Bolivia 0.58  57.08 28.62 170.98 35.12 134.90  491.09 789.72 
El Salvador 0.00  34.68 15.08 139.55 22.28 100.71  356.63 594.21 
Paraguay 0.00  21.43 8.97 101.70 15.87 86.59  315.77 500.65 
Nicaragua  0.01  17.06 14.32 99.33 14.04 82.86  292.18 463.06 
Costa Rica 0.00  12.60 15.54 73.48 22.51 63.17  231.43 342.62 
Uruguay 0.45  39.68 50.36 104.54 21.16 55.42  177.89 305.56 
Namibia  0.00  11.14 0.00 31.91 6.14 29.91  108.04 174.84 
Tajikistan 20.37  29.48 347.13 121.53 62.08 101.66  350.32 173.42 
Mongolia 0.00  17.43 41.34 52.19 37.74 41.29  138.04 169.87 
Botswana 0.00  5.31 4.39 30.41 15.73 27.85  98.20 141.65 
Gabon 0.00  8.84 33.54 22.87 11.19 19.01  69.05 75.05 
Reunion Island 0.00  4.87 4.14 16.82 8.59 11.84  41.99 62.78 
Guadeloupe 0.00  5.82 4.48 11.77 6.77 7.06  23.43 36.84 
Western Sahara  0.00  0.25 0.84 3.59 0.96 5.16  23.53 30.72 
Martinique  0.00  4.69 6.45 11.78 8.25 6.48  21.18 29.43 
Total 813.61 13677.13 6461.47 49071.41 8370.21 39314.05 142089.16 228506.44 
 
emissions of these six countries would be 9.21 GtC by 
2050. As for the four former Soviet Republics (Ukraine, 
Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova), although their histori-
cal CEPC was high, their total emissions reduced sig-
nificantly between independence in the early 1990s and 
2005; therefore, emissions in these countries might ac-
tually be expected to increase in the short term before 
finally decreasing. Assuming that their annual emissions 
from 2006 to 2050 will be 1.19 tC per capita, which 
equals the global average allowance for emissions in 
that period, the projected total emissions for these coun-
tries will be 3.48 GtC. The emissions history of the three 
umbrella-shaped countries is similar to that of the US, so 
basing projections on US emissions targets their total 
projected emissions will be 18.62 GtC. The total ex-
pected emissions from 2006 to 2050 of countries in Ta-
ble 1, therefore, are 96.63 GtC (Table 5). 
Each of the 33 countries and regions from Table 2 
that needs to reduce its gross emissions faces unique 
challenges in establishing and implementing controls 
(Table 6). Given that these countries and regions are at 
various stages of social and economic development, 
their total future emissions need to be estimated by in-
dependently assessing distinct subgroup’s emissions. 
Containing the 10 EU countries in Table 2, the first sub-
group’s total expected emissions of 7.43 GtC from 2006 
to 2050 are calculable from established EU targets. The 
second subgroup includes Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
Japan, and New Zealand. The projected emissions of the 
European countries in this group are calculated accord-
ing to the EU targets; those of Japan and New Zealand, 
on the other hand, are determined according to US esti-
mates. Thus, the projected emissions of these five coun-
tries are 10.31 GtC. The third subgroup includes three 
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 Table 5  Projected emissions from 2006 to 2050 of countries with “emission deficits”  
Countries Emissions per capita in 2005 (tC/a) 
Growth rate from 
1996 to 2005 (%)
Expected emissions 
from 2006 to 2050 
(MtC) 
Expected emissions 
per capita from 2006
to 2050 (tC) 
1900―2005 Cumu-
lative emissions per 
capita (tC) 
Cumulative emis-
sions per capita from 
1900 to 2050 (tC)
US 5.26 1.06 44626.95 148.83 467.88 616.71 
Germany 2.59 −0.56 6542.48 79.16 271.32 350.48 
UK 2.48 −0.06 3972.09 65.93 303.13 369.06 
Russia 2.85 0.02 11615.31 80.69 164.00 244.69 
Canada 4.55 2.39 4153.19 128.70 335.80 464.50 
Australia 4.96 1.87 2850.00 140.32 260.62 400.94 
Poland 2.16 −1.30 2366.01 61.94 187.17 249.11 
Belgium 2.69 −0.10 705.64 67.86 277.31 345.17 
Ukraine 1.90 −2.45 2512.46 53.55 153.20 206.75 
Czech Republic 3.21 −0.03 955.02 93.70 246.72 340.42 
France 1.69 0.60 2589.02 42.45 161.85 204.30 
Kazakhstan 3.25 1.35 1994.91 131.15 164.51 295.66 
Slovakia 1.86 −1.02 440.54 81.78 227.83 309.61 
Netherlands 2.10 −0.79 958.99 58.73 181.12 239.85 
United Arab Emirates 8.23 13.10 1364.31 332.43 429.79 762.22 
Denmark 2.32 −1.23 344.03 63.51 197.77 261.28 
Kuwait 9.46 6.45 1031.90 382.18 392.00 774.18 
Qatar 17.08 4.90 549.28 690.05 737.78 1427.83 
Belarus 1.76 0.05 524.52 53.55 149.26 202.81 
Luxemburg 6.76 3.30 72.55 158.75 445.01 603.76 
Saudi Arabia 4.41 5.15 4202.21 177.97 151.72 329.69 
Estonia 3.70 0.25 137.97 102.66 174.59 277.25 
Brunei 4.30 2.44 64.96 173.70 495.88 669.58 
Lithuania 1.11 −1.13 270.38 78.94 140.46 219.40 
Georgia 0.29 10.06 239.53 53.55 128.59 182.14 
Austria 2.42 2.41 436.86 52.68 143.55 196.23 
Latvia 0.76 −3.37 187.81 81.59 137.27 218.86 
Sweden 1.46 0.79 347.14 38.41 142.99 181.40 
Moldova 0.57 −2.44 207.61 53.55 133.56 187.11 
Finland 2.77 0.67 361.67 68.94 131.28 200.22 
 
former Soviet Republics and North Korea, all of which 
are developing countries. Assuming that their future 
emissions per capita are controlled within the global 
emissions standard of 1.19 tC per capita annually, their 
total projected emissions are 3.30 GtC. The fourth sub-
group includes five net export countries of oil and gas 
(Oman, Libya, Venezuela, Iran, and Turkmenistan). As-
suming that they can make uniform emissions reductions 
of 20% (based on 2005 values) by 2050, their total pro-
jected emissions are 8.04 GtC. The nine countries and 
regions in the remaining subgroup are each at various 
levels of social and economic development, but all share 
the same tendency towards high emissions per capita 
with considerable rates of increase. Assuming that South 
Korea, Hong Kong, and Israel could uniformly decrease 
their emissions by 40% by 2050, based on 2005 values, 
and that the other six countries in the subgroup (Malay-
sia, South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Turkey, and Serbia) could maintain their 2005 emissions  
levels, the total expected emissions of these nine coun-
tries and regions are 14.48 GtC for the 2006―2050 pe-
riod. Accordingly, the total expected emissions of the 
countries and regions in Table 2 are 43.55 GtC (Table 6). 
Table 3 contains the 63 rapidly developing countries 
and regions (including the 38 from the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS)) that need to reduce their emis-
sions growth rates. From 1996―2005, the growth rates 
of carbon emissions from each of these countries were 
high (between 1.42% and 14.79%), and assigned quotas 
indicate that future emissions per capita for each of them 
can be greater than they were in 2005; in other words, 
their emissions except the Kyrgyzstan can all be higher 
than 1.19 tC by 2050 (see Table 7). What this means is 
that these countries can increase their carbon emissions 
in the short term before having to make choices for re-
ducing their emissions in the long term. Assuming that 
these countries can reduce their emissions growth rates 
gradually into the future and keep their total emissions 
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 Table 6  Projected emissions of countries and regions needing to reduce their gross emissions  
Countries or regions 
Emissions per 




from 2006 to 
2050 (tC/a) 
Growth rate from 
1996 to 2005 (%)
Expected emis-
sions from 2006 
to 2050 (MtC)
Expected emis-
sions per capita 
from 2006 to 
2050 (tC) 
Emissions per 
capita from 1900 
to 2005 (tC) 
Expected emis-
sions per capita 
from 1900 to 
2050 (tC) 
Iran 1.78 1.28 4.96 4979.14 71.72 50.59 122.31 
South Korea 2.58 1.19 2.22 4418.51 92.30 58.14 150.44 
Italy 2.10 0.88 0.98 2898.28 49.42 88.95 138.37 
Spain 2.16 1.13 3.99 1746.50 40.24 75.09 115.33 
Japan 2.62 0.35 0.84 9503.84 74.31 115.10 189.41 
Malaysia 2.55 1.34 7.89 2945.57 114.82 41.57 156.39 
Venezuela 1.51 0.79 1.66 1633.17 61.11 108.95 170.06 
North Korea 0.95 0.76 −5.67 1264.64 53.55 87.64 141.19 
Romania 1.12 0.80 −3.02 967.98 44.76 90.04 134.80 
Serbia  1.37 1.36 3.55 607.32 61.58 59.86 121.44 
South Africa 2.33 0.26 1.57 5020.65 104.73 159.26 263.99 
Greece 2.34 1.14 2.12 553.77 49.89 70.84 120.73 
Hong Kong 1.49 1.27 3.09 376.76 53.39 47.26 100.65 
Uzbekistan 1.15 0.32 1.42 1424.06 53.55 142.36 195.91 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.83 1.41 25.10 322.70 82.43 59.20 141.63 
Hungary 1.53 0.50 −0.14 416.95 41.34 108.59 149.93 
Switzerland 1.51 0.67 0.59 298.29 40.18 107.01 147.19 
Israel 2.59 0.64 2.23 621.49 92.87 92.85 185.72 
Bulgaria 1.57 0.51 −2.21 472.48 61.00 99.23 160.23 
Libya 2.59 0.56 2.75 618.56 104.52 97.65 202.17 
Macedonia  1.38 1.28 −0.16 126.14 62.01 64.52 126.53 
Slovenia 2.03 1.19 0.71 85.06 42.55 71.08 113.63 
Oman 3.42 0.84 7.50 346.71 138.30 65.65 203.95 
New Zealand 1.99 0.44 1.87 231.38 56.47 135.96 192.43 
Azerbaijan 1.20 0.20 1.41 447.25 53.55 140.02 193.57 
Ireland 2.79 0.33 2.52 238.45 57.56 128.35 185.91 
Norway 3.11 0.23 5.89 256.95 55.39 131.00 186.39 
Cyprus 2.29 1.14 3.29 37.31 44.63 66.46 111.09 
Montenegro  1.37 1.32 3.62 37.44 61.58 59.86 121.44 
Malta 1.73 1.49 -0.27 16.35 40.57 53.50 94.07 
Turkmenistan 2.35 0.09 2.64 459.07 94.99 154.50 249.49 
Armenia 0.39 0.09 3.66 161.61 53.55 128.48 182.03 
Iceland 2.01 0.47 1.28 14.56 49.18 109.37 158.55 
 
within their quotas, their total expected emissions will 
be 186.72 GtC for the period 2006―2050. 
The 80 countries (including the 49 Least Developed 
Countries (LDC)) that can maintain their current emis-
sions growth rates are all developing countries (Table 4). 
They share two features: low current emissions per cap-
ita (all were below 0.95 tC in 2005, while those of the 
LDCs were below 0.05 tC); and low emissions growth 
rates from 1996 to 2005. Even if these countries main-
tain their current growth rates, their emissions will 
surely not exceed their quotas by 2050. Two assump-
tions are made in estimating the future emissions of 
these countries: nations with average growth rates over 
3% from 1996 to 2005 will maintain those rates from 
2006 to 2050, and countries with rates below 3% in 
1996―2005 will maintain 3% growth before 2050. The 
total projected emissions of the countries in Table 4 are 
90.91 GtC (Table 8). 
The total expected emissions of all countries listed in 
Tables 5―8 are 417.80 GtC, which is 69.37 GtC more 
than the total global emissions limit of 348.43 GtC if 
CO2 concentration levels are fixed at 470 ppmv. If this 
excess CO2 were released into the atmosphere over the 
next 45 years, then atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
would reach 485.05 ppmv by 2050. 
6  The difficulties of achieving a 470 ppmv 
CO2 concentration  
In the real world, the total CO2 emissions for each coun-
try are essentially determined by three factors: popula-
tion, energy consumption per capita, and energy struc-
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 Table 7  Expected emissions of countries and regions that need to reduce their emissions growth rates  
Countries or regions 
Emissions per 




from 2006 to 2050 
(tC/a) 
Growth rate from 
1996 to 2005 (%)
Expected emis-
sions from 2006 
to 2050 (MtC)
Expected emis-
sions per capita 
from 2006 to 2050 
(tC) 
Emissions per 
capita from 1900 
to 2005 (tC) 
Expected emis-
sions per capita 
form 1900 to 2005
(tC) 
China 1.15  1.86  5.90  109906.51  83.71  24.14  107.85 
Indonesia 0.51  1.97  7.23  20029.13  88.60  11.30  99.90 
Nigeria 0.22  1.83  14.79  11660.26  82.49  7.69  90.18 
Vietnam 0.33  1.98  13.45  7594.50  89.32  8.09  97.41 
Mexico 1.10  1.35  1.42  6327.88  60.69  51.26  111.95 
Egypt 0.65  1.79  6.62  5878.86  80.70  17.71  98.41 
Turkey 0.93  1.65  3.96  5404.37  74.06  29.06  103.12 
Thailand 1.17  1.69  4.28  4788.19  76.00  19.50  95.50 
AOSIS 1.15  1.41  2.31  2928.34  63.43  29.61  93.04 
Argentina 1.08  1.36  2.60  2368.71  61.13  61.39  122.52 
Algeria 1.14  1.52  4.16  2246.49  68.38  32.51  100.89 
Ivory Coast 0.13  1.81  12.85  1516.03  81.57  5.50  87.07 
Syria 0.99  1.50  5.49  1275.20  67.49  27.13  94.62 
Chile 1.11  1.51  4.36  1107.49  67.96  49.72  117.68 
Portugal 1.62  1.67  2.31  791.31  75.16  49.11  124.27 
Honduras 0.30  1.84  6.87  564.75  82.64  7.83  90.47 
Jordan 1.01  1.45  4.26  361.51  65.21  30.04  95.25 
Palestine 0.05  1.88  8.07  318.39  84.63  1.29  85.92 
Croatia 1.37  1.51  2.64  309.36  67.98  60.49  128.47 
Congo 0.15  1.85  9.78  301.34  83.47  5.68  89.15 
Lebanon 1.15  1.54  2.52  277.38  69.15  37.40  106.55 
Albania 0.30  1.94  7.52  274.93  87.17  23.09  110.26 
Panama 0.50  1.72  6.56  249.51  77.20  21.40  98.60 
Kyrgyzstan 0.29  0.47  3.00  110.06  21.15  129.14  150.29 
Swaziland 0.23  1.87  9.63  94.88  84.34  6.96  91.30 
Macao 1.29  1.54  6.31  32.74  69.21  26.71  95.92 
 
ture. Although the projected CO2 emissions for each 
country are estimated in the previous section for the pe-
riod 2006―2050, the feasibility of controlling actual 
emissions within the limits of the projections is neces-
sary to be further analyzed on the basis of the three fac-
tors, which are detailed below. 
First, the world’s most developed countries, including 
27 EU countries, the US, Australia, New Zealand, Can-
ada, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, 
must tackle their significant compulsion to over-    
consuming if they are to meet their 2050 target. The to-
tal combined population of these countries is 1.131 bil-
lion, which was 17.36% of total global population in 
2005. According to Tables 5―7, even if these countries 
managed to achieve enormous emissions reductions, 
their total CO2 emissions in the period 2006―2050 
would still be 102.46 GtC, which is 24.52% of total 
global emissions allowance. Emissions from these coun-
tries, therefore, are disproportionately large compared to 
the size of their populations. To the year 2050, if these 
countries could reduce their emissions by 80% com-
pared to those in 1990 or 2005, their CO2 emissions per 
capita would drop to 0.27―0.90 tC, which is only 1/3 of 
their current emissions from transport alone. How, then, 
can these countries meet such a limit of emissions per 
capita by 2050? Low rates of population increase in 
these countries will be counterbalanced by higher life 
expectancies and increased immigration, so their total 
population by 2050 is predicted to increase by 4.56% 
from 2005 levels[21]. Thus, emissions per capita in these 
countries have to be further reduced to 0.25―0.86 tC by 
2050 from population increases alone. Another factor 
affecting emissions is changes in per capita energy con-
sumption. Currently, even though energy consumptions 
per capita in these 36 countries are already very high, 
the likelihood of reductions is quite low because de-
clines in energy consumptions typically result in com-
parable declines in living standards. This factor, there-
fore, is not dependable as a means to ensure emissions 
reductions. Additionally, because energy consumption in 
several EU countries is not very high at present, few 
choices remain for emissions reductions other than a 
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 Table 8  Expected emissions of countries that can maintain their current growth rates  
Countries 
Emissions per 




from 2006 to 2050 
(tC/a) 
Growth rate from 







sions per capita 
from 2006 to 2050 
(tC) 
Emissions per 




sions per capita 
from 1900 to 2050 
(tC) 
India 0.34  1.94  4.42  54284.52  47.85  10.79  58.64 
LDC Union 0.05  1.96  5.05  6936.64  9.05  2.09  11.14 
Brazil 0.48  1.79  2.76  8483.78  45.41  20.27  65.68 
Pakistan 0.23  1.86  4.86  5908.63  37.38  5.95  43.33 
Philippines  0.24  1.85  1.99  1953.77  23.10  9.76  32.86 
Colombia 0.36  1.76  0.11  1527.26  33.98  21.65  55.63 
Kenya 0.09  1.81  4.86  487.16  13.68  4.29  17.97 
Morocco 0.43  1.91  4.83  2089.38  68.52  11.24  79.76 
Peru 0.37  1.84  4.94  1662.29  60.95  19.55  80.50 
Ghana 0.09  1.89  3.51  219.30  9.73  3.66  13.39 
Sri Lanka 0.16  2.19  6.96  908.37  47.51  4.43  51.94 
Iraq 0.82  1.42  1.74  2203.31  78.70  43.88  122.58 
Cameroon 0.06  1.92  0.21  96.84  5.44  2.94  8.38 
Guatemala 0.25  1.86  5.00  523.79  41.21  7.76  48.97 
Ecuador 0.61  1.73  3.47  867.10  66.39  20.51  86.90 
Zimbabwe 0.24  1.70  −3.05  298.63  22.76  35.89  58.65 
Tunis 0.59  1.83  3.46  648.90  64.22  18.11  82.33 
Bolivia 0.27  1.91  2.66  241.14  26.26  10.68  36.94 
El Salvador 0.26  1.98  2.12  166.75  25.01  7.71  32.72 
Paraguay 0.18  1.88  0.12  101.04  17.11  6.14  23.25 
Nicaragua  0.20  1.88  3.34  111.83  20.47  8.13  28.60 
Costa Rica 0.46  1.76  4.24  268.23  61.99  13.55  75.54 
Uruguay 0.46  2.04  2.86  144.88  43.56  25.21  68.77 
Namibia  0.35  1.92  4.45  99.72  49.37  3.29  52.66 
Tajikistan 0.22  0.59  0.67  136.47  20.84  128.74  149.58 
Mongolia 0.93  1.46  1.12  229.11  88.77  42.30  131.07 
Botswana 0.68  1.71  3.15  123.70  67.37  13.55  80.92 
Gabon 0.32  1.29  −5.82  39.16  30.33  59.71  90.04 
Reunion Island 0.79  1.78  1.77  59.31  75.55  20.56  96.11 
Guadeloupe 1.10  1.87  1.63  46.13  105.31  29.86  135.17 
Western Sahara  0.15  1.55  1.33  6.21  14.11  10.06  24.17 
Martinique  0.90  1.65  −3.19  34.09  86.10  41.45  127.55 
 
complete transformation of energy structure.  
Sweden is the best example of how the development 
of a clean energy infrastructure can lead to significant 
decreases in CO2 emissions. Currently, nuclear power 
and hydroelectricity account for more than 90% of total 
electric power output in Sweden[23]. Reflecting this out-
put, Sweden’s total CO2 emission per capita in 2005 was 
only 1.46 tC, which was mainly from transport and 
household emissions. Steel and cement production ac-
counted for a small part. In fact, the only real opportu-
nity available for developed countries with relatively 
low emissions such as Sweden to further reduce emis-
sions is to decrease oil and gas consumption from 
transport and household life. Doing so would obviously 
be very difficult.  
In reality, CO2 emissions from most EU countries 
were not reduced after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol. 
On the contrary, some had varying levels of increase. 
For example, the emissions of Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland in 2007 increased 7.54%, 9.75%, and 15.54%, 
respectively, from 2005 totals[19]. These increases from 
some of Europe’s most conscientious states illustrate the 
difficulties inherent in achieving CO2 emissions reduc-
tions. If by 2020 the EU hopes to reduce its emissions 
by 30% relative to 1990 levels, then its entire energy 
infrastructure needs to be transformed along the lines of 
countries like Sweden. This will require extraordinary 
development of nuclear power and new, clean energy 
resources. Because the capacity of the EU to reach its 
ambitious 2050 target for emissions is so dependent on 
the reality of its progress by 2020, we hesitate to esti-
mate on the likelihood of its success.   
Achieving CO2 emissions target will be even more 
difficult for the United States, where CO2 emissions per 
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 capita from transport and livelihoods alone reach about 
2.5 tC. This is about twice the current global average 
level. Although the US has great potential for develop-
ing bioenergy, mass production of this resource would 
only increase emissions both from land use and from 
bioenergy production itself; therefore, bioenergy devel-
opment may actually have little impact on the reduction 
of US’s total CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, the US’s 
great potential for nuclear energy faces significant po-
litical obstacles and considerable public opposition. Ad-
ditionally, renewable energy resources such as wind, 
solar, and geothermal cannot be relied upon to support a 
fundamental change in the US energy structure in a short 
time. Circumstances in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand are similar to that of the United States. Finally, 
Japan, with its global standing as a leading manufacturer, 
also faces immense difficulties in reducing its annual per 
capita emissions by 80% from 2.62 tC to 0.52 tC. The 
only conclusion possible from these figures is that de-
veloped countries will face great challenges to reducing 
their emissions unless their capacities to artificially se-
quester carbon are greatly improved. 
For oil and gas net exporters in Tables 5 and 6, they 
mostly have high CO2 emissions because of their cheap 
and abundant oil and gas sources; economically, they 
have no incentive to develop alternative energy. There-
fore, their reduction of total emissions by 20% by 2050 
relative to 2005 levels is rather optimistic. As far as 
other countries in Tables 5 and 6 are concerned, most of 
them are at various stages of development and at the 
phase where energy consumption per capita tends to 
increase annually. Thus, they will face numerous diffi-
culties in making adjustments in their energy infrastruc-
tures. Offering projected emissions for these countries, 
especially considering population growth, is too auda-
cious even to hazard at this time. 
For the 63 countries that need to reduce their emis-
sions growth rates (Table 7), to take the necessary ac-
tions to control their total emissions will also prove very 
difficult. China provides an excellent example. Based on 
its emissions per capita in 2005 as well as its growth 
rates from 1996―2005, China’s emissions per capita are 
expected to peak by 2035, at which time it will enter a 
new stage of industrialization and urbanization. At that 
time, China looks to replicate Japan’s 2005 per capita 
energy consumption figures (2.62 tC) and energy infra-
structure because Japan in the first years of the 21st 
century was the most energy-efficient of all fossil fuel 
dependent developed countries. In 2035, the emissions 
per capita of China are so projected to be 2.62 tC. From 
2035 to 2050, further reductions are assumed possible in 
China’s per capita energy consumption due to changes in 
energy infrastructure, leading to a gradual decrease in 
emissions per capita to 1.69 tC, the equivalent of 
France’s nuclear intensive energy infrastructure in 2005. 
According to UN estimates of population growth 
rates[21], the population of China by 2035 will reach 
1.458 billion and its total emissions will be 3.82 GtC; by 
2050, however, both its population and its total emis-
sions will drop, by 1.409 billion and 2.38 GtC, respec-
tively. Assuming that these changes occur uniformly, a 
total emission of 126.97 GtC over the period 2006―
2050 in China can be projected (Figure 5), being far 
greater than the emissions limit of 109.91 GtC.  
 
Figure 5  Projection of China’s CO2 emissions from 2006―2050. 
 
Most other countries in Table 7 are in situations simi-
lar to China’s, experiencing periods of rapid industriali-
zation and urbanization with correspondingly strong 
demands for energy and immense investments in infra-
structure. Additionally, most of these countries lack the 
financial and technological means to adjust their energy 
structure and their population growth rates surpass 
China’s. Therefore, controlling actual emissions within 
the projected allowances listed in Table 7 will prove 
very difficult. 
Finally, for those countries in Table 8 that can main-
tain their current rates of emissions, the largest uncer-
tainty is whether or not these countries can maintain 
their low emissions growth rates (averaging 2.36%) in 
the past 10 years. The answer is probably ‘no’ if these 
countries follow the paradigm of rapid industrialization 
and urbanization standardized over the last several cen-
turies by nations now enjoying the prosperity of devel-
opment.  
As was illustrated in Figure 3, countries with high 
levels of economic growth also typically experience pe-
riods of rapid growth in their CO2 emissions. For exam-
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 ple, during 1978―1998, China’s CO2 emissions grew at 
a rate of 4.20%, while during 1999―2005 its rate was as 
high as 8.81%. In contrast, although India has not yet 
begun extensive large-scale infrastructure projects like a 
national highway system and its emissions per capita 
currently remain low, its rapidly growing population and 
immense size assures that it will, at some time in the 
near future, enter a stage of large-scale construction that 
will lead to rapid development of high emissions indus-
tries like steel and cement as well as increased con-
sumption of transport and consumer goods. In addition, 
most of the countries in this group have high population 
growth rates, and their populations could increase by up 
to 50% from current levels by 2050, significantly inten-
sifying their emissions growth rate. The only way for 
these countries to control emissions is to develop clean 
and renewable energy resources as soon as possible, 
though financial and technological support remains an 
obstacle to achieving this goal. For these countries to 
reach their emissions projections (Table 8), developed 
countries will have to provide significant funding and 
technology transfers, although for various reasons this 
requirement seems hopeless. 
In summary, our analysis demonstrates that immense 
challenges will make controlling global atmospheric 
CO2 concentration below 470 ppmv by 2050 exception-
ally difficult. 
7  Discussion and conclusions 
A worldwide consensus has been reached: controlling 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations without global coordi-
nation is impossible. The primary objective of the 
forthcoming negotiations on climate change in Denmark 
in December of 2009 is to frame a mechanism that en-
ables members of the international community to con-
tend with climate change cooperatively; ultimately, these 
negotiations should be viewed as no less than a means 
through which a new global era of responsibility can be 
devised and enacted.  
In the current context of international political 
gamesmanship, protecting national interests has been 
and will continue to be a top priority. In such a situation, 
the international community faces exceptional chal-
lenges in shaping an accord that equitably distributes 
responsibility for controlling CO2 concentrations. To 
meet these challenges, countries advocating for their 
own national interests must be held to a high interna-
tional standard of logic based on valid scientific data.  
In order to provide a solid scientific foundation rooted 
in a fair and just system of responsibility for the forth-
coming international negotiation process, emission al-
lowances for different sets of countries have been calcu-
lated in the previous sections. What follows is an ex-
tended discussion of nine key issues that are currently 
“hot topics” in the international climate change negotia-
tion process. 
7.1  The subject of negotiations: reduction or allow-
ance? 
Typically, two major approaches are considered in dis-
cussions of the control of atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions, one emphasizing emissions reductions[3,5,6,8] and 
the other emphasizing allocations of emissions rights[4]. 
Although there is no fundamental difference between the 
two approaches, and their purposes of reducing the in-
tensity of emissions are the same, each leads to a very 
different result at the operational level. Currently, much 
research and many discussions are focused on the first 
approach. Technically speaking, the emissions reduc-
tions approach sets a certain year and emission level as a 
target, and then reduces emissions year by year until that 
target is met. The second approach, on the other hand, 
focuses on allocation of emission allowances in a certain 
period for different countries. In this approach, a neces-
sary flexibility is offered to countries in totally limiting 
their emissions over this time interval. According to Ta-
bles 5―8, in recent years, emissions have continued to 
increase for most countries; indeed, few countries, in-
cluding some developed countries, have negative growth. 
In fact, emissions in many countries around the world 
are expected to increase steadily into the future, and in 
some developing countries, where both cumulative and 
current per capita emissions are low, even emissions 
growth rates are expected to intensify.  
Therefore, if climate negotiations in Denmark estab-
lish an international system of responsibility based on 
the first approach, i.e., emissions reductions, enormous 
differences in both cumulative and per capita emissions 
of different countries will be obscured, an obfuscation 
that will be strongly resisted by developing countries. 
Recently, for example, G8 countries suggested that 
global CO2 emissions should be reduced by 50% by 
2050, while emissions from G8 countries should be re-
duced by 80%. From a percentages perspective, G8 
countries seem to make a greater contribution to emis- 
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 sions reductions than the rest of the world in this pro-
posal. When per capita emissions are taken into account, 
however, this proposal results in a huge unfairness. To 
demonstrate this conclusion, a quantitative analysis of 
this proposal, with 1990 as the baseline, was undertaken. 
In 1990, global emissions totaled 5.79 GtC, including 
2.87 GtC from G8 countries. By 2050, projected global 
emissions are targeted to decline by 2.895 GtC, with 
0.574 GtC being produced by G8 countries. From 1990 
to 2005, cumulative emissions of G8 countries were 
46.83 GtC, with 3.06 GtC being produced in 2005 alone. 
If G8 emissions were reduced uniformly from the 2005 
total to 0.574 GtC in 2050, their cumulative emissions 
over the 2006―2050 period would be 80.49 GtC; the 
total cumulative emissions from 1990 to 2050 would 
then be 127.32 GtC, and the cumulative emissions per 
capita would be 146.94 tC (based on 2005 population 
data). In contrast, a 150.62 GtC cumulative emission of 
other countries from 2006 to 2050 would be targeted; 
between 1990 and 2005, the emissions of these countries 
were 54.08 GtC. Total cumulative emissions from 1990 
to 2050, therefore, would be 204.70 GtC, with 36.24 tC 
being the cumulative emissions per capita. By compari-
son, cumulative emissions per capita of G8 countries 
during the 1990―2050 period are designed to be four 
times those of other countries. Furthermore, cumulative 
emissions per capita of G8 countries from 1900 to 1989 
were 209.64 tC, 8.84 times the 23.71 tC cumulative 
emissions of other countries. Therefore, the total cumu-
lative emissions per capita of G8 countries from 1900 to 
2050 would be 356.58 tC, nearly 6 times those from 
other countries, which total only 59.95 tC cumulatively. 
Notably, these calculations specifically compare G8 
countries with “other countries,” which include a num-
ber of developed and oil producing countries with high 
cumulative emissions, so the majority of developing 
countries are left with even smaller emissions alloca-
tions. The only possible conclusion from this analysis is 
that the terms of the G8 proposal would be fundamen-
tally unequal and unjust as the basis of an internationally 
recognized accord. 
Conversely, establishment at the negotiations in 
Denmark of an international system of responsibility to 
control atmospheric CO2 concentrations on the basis of 
emissions allowances, would be based on quantitative 
results rooted in the principles of fairness and justice. 
Through such an approach, both historical and practical 
considerations as well as the special demands of differ-
ent countries can be fully considered. Therefore, the 
current simplistic issue of "reduction" led by a few de-
veloped countries must be changed; future international 
negotiations must first set a target CO2 concentration 
and then allocate emissions allowances for different 
countries based on that target and in consideration of the 
special circumstances of all countries. 
7.2  Is the 470 ppmv target appropriate? 
Rational principles should guide long-term concentra-
tion targets for global atmospheric CO2 controls, making 
sure that these targets are neither too high to impede 
economic and social development nor too low to weaken 
its purpose. In the months prior to the climate negotia-
tions in Denmark, the international community should 
not equivocate on the reality that global energy demands 
will increase year by year into the foreseeable future and 
that the international community must be both responsi-
ble and resourceful in meeting the challenges of this 
growth, especially as doing so is a firm requirement for 
accomplishing the United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. Because the reality is that global energy 
demands will continue to increase, successfully imple-
menting controls on atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
will depend on further development of clean and re-
newable energy technologies, improved energy effi-
ciency, implementation of carbon sequestration proc-
esses, and reductions of global birth rates. Furthermore, 
the international community must not exaggerate the 
negative impacts of increased atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations and cause unnecessary panic among the public.  
Target atmospheric CO2 concentrations at an appro-
priate level of 470 ppmv by 2050 have been proposed 
and projected emissions for scores of countries by that 
year have been estimated in this paper. The results show 
that this target might be too high and prove extremely 
difficult to achieve; however, also demonstrated in this 
paper is that if countries could control their emissions 
according to the projections calculated in Tables 5―8, 
total excess emissions would only be about 69.37 GtC. 
This excess could be counterbalanced if the international 
community commits itself to developing the processes 
of carbon sequestration in suitable ecosystems. 
How many degrees would the temperature rise based 
on current levels after atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
reached 470 ppmv? Do humans have the ability to adapt 
to this warming? These two questions will continue to 
produce broad discussions. Although scientists are still 
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 unable to answer them exactly, conjecture can be guided 
by the maxim, "to understand the future, we must study 
the past." According to The Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4) of the IPCC[1] (page 37, Figure TS.6), from 1880 
to 2005 greenhouse gas concentrations increased by 
about 150 ppmv CO2 equivalent, and global tempera-
tures increased by 0.6ºC[1]. At this rate, atmospheric CO2 
concentrations will have increased by an additional 80 
ppmv by 2050, which simply translates to temperatures 
increasing at a rate of less than 0.1ºC every 10 years (we 
do not think that there is compelling evidence for the 
total cooling effect of atmospheric aerosols). If the 
planet reenters a stage of natural cooling, which hap-
pened from the 1940s to 1970s, a period when atmos-
pheric CO2 concentrations were rapidly increasing, then 
global temperatures would not significantly increase 
over this period. The fact is that over the past 100 years, 
although global population has increased from 1.587 
billion to 6.515 billion[20,21], overall living standards, 
despite global warming, have greatly improved, which 
indicates that the human capacity to adapt to climate 
change is very strong, especially when reinforced by 
rapid advances in science and technology. 
In short, we believe that the 470 ppmv target for at-
mospheric CO2 concentrations is appropriate. If, how-
ever, this target needs to be adjusted, then the method 
proposed in this paper can be utilized to recalculate the 
emissions allowances for different countries. 
7.3  What is the optimum approach for emissions 
allowance allocations?  
By consensus, the international community has recog-
nized that the principles of fairness and justice must un-
derlie contemporary international relations; accordingly, 
these principles must be followed in allocating emis-
sions allowances among countries. Unfortunately, how-
ever, their realization in the forthcoming negotiations at 
Denmark may face serious opposition. The previous 
sections of this paper have demonstrated that these un-
derlying principles would be best reflected through an 
approach to emissions control that allocates allowances 
based on cumulative per capita emissions. Indeed, at the 
upcoming international negotiations, the principle of 
emissions rights should be emphasized as a form of de-
velopment rights, which is an important part of universal 
human rights. Without consensus on this principle, ac-
tion might be taken to usurp the “common but differen-
tiated responsibilities” principle, the basis of close co-
operation between countries on climate change since 
Kyoto. Consensus, on the other hand, will ensure that 
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” para-
digm is upheld in crafting and implementing a sound 
international agreement. 
7.4  What year should be the baseline for calculating 
cumulative emissions per capita?  
Although the CEPC index advances fairness and justice, 
the problem of setting the baseline year for calculations 
remains. In the forthcoming negotiations, countries with 
higher cumulative emissions will understandably lobby 
for a baseline set at as late a date as possible, while 
countries with low cumulative emissions will argue that 
an earlier baseline date is more reasonable. Considering 
the impact of the burning of fossil fuels on the historical 
increase in global atmospheric CO2 concentrations, 
some may believe that the Industrial Revolution is the 
most rational baseline for calculations. Before the indus-
trial revolution, atmospheric CO2 concentrations were 
about 280 ppmv, almost the same level as in the Holo-
cene and recent inter-glacial periods[24,25]. From the be-
ginning of the industrial revolution to 1900, however, 
human activities increased atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions by 19 ppmv, mainly from rapid industrial devel-
opment in a few countries’ emissions. The year 1900 has 
been recognized as the baseline year for calculating cu-
mulative emissions per capita in this study because nu-
merous errors were found to exist in datasets before that 
year. Most notably, the increase in the number of sover-
eign states after 1900 has caused some errors in the cal-
culation of new countries’ historical emissions. For ex-
ample, CO2 emissions in the Soviet Union were high, 
but its division into 15 sovereign states in 1991 has 
made calculating individual emissions from these coun-
tries for the period from 1900 to 1991 very difficult. Fur-
thermore, because average emissions were calculated 
based on population, a number of countries with low 
levels of development seem to have oddly high levels of 
cumulative emissions per capita (see Tables 1―4). In 
addition, data is generally recognized as being basically 
reliable after 1900. Calculations for each of the periods 
1900―1949, 1950―1989, 1990―2005 and 2006―
2050 in this paper are intended to provide accurate data 
for potential discussion and debate.  
It should be noted that developed countries’ techno-
logical innovations have caused additional emissions 
around the world. Developing countries have, admittedly, 
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 also benefited from these innovations, so developed 
countries’ argument to push back the starting year for 
calculation is understandable.  
7.5  How can countries with excess emissions take 
action? 
If, hypothetically, emissions per capita of all countries 
over the next 45 years were to reach the projected aver-
age emissions levels of the G8 (83.69 tC), then total 
global emissions over the 2006―2050 interval could 
exceed 545 GtC, even if there is no increase in global 
populations. By the end of that period, atmospheric CO2 
concentrations would surpass 512 ppmv. Such a future is 
untenable, of course, but what actions can be taken to 
prevent these outcomes and by whom? 
Based on the 470 ppmv CO2 target, countries listed in 
Table 1 had already exceeded their emissions allocations 
by 2005; emissions from a part of the countries listed in 
Table 2 will exceed their allocations in the near future. 
Of course, this study has shown that cumulative emis-
sions per capita from 2006 to 2050 can only be 53.55 tC 
based on 2005 population data, but for some countries 
with high emissions like the US, the EU, Japan, Canada, 
and Australia, even if their reduction targets are met by 
substantial margins, their cumulative emissions per cap-
ita from 2006 to 2050 will still be well above that 53.55 
tC limit (148.83 tC, 58.03 tC, 74.31 tC, 128.70 tC, and 
140.32 tC, respectively). In other words, emissions from 
these countries will maintain very high levels. Projec-
tions also indicate that the emissions deficits of G8 
countries from 1900―2005, assuming a value of CO2 of 
only 20 US$/ton, were 5.53 trillion US dollars and that  
the estimated value of emissions from 2006―2050 will  
be 6.30 trillion US dollars (Table 9). The total value of 
G8’s excess emissions for the entire 150-year period, 
and therefore could be as high as 11.83 trillion US dol-
lars.  
Two approaches for those countries with excess emis-
sions to take action in leading the world away from ca-
lamity in the future are hereby proposed: 1) provide 
substantial funding to the developing world for technol-
ogy transfers, carbon fixation, adaptations to climate 
change and clean energy development; and 2) set ambi-
tious midterm reduction targets to provide an innovative 
model of development to economically and technologi-
cally emerging countries. 
Of course, achieving zero emissions by any country, 
whether developed or developing, will be impossible for 
a long time into the future. A component of the forth-
coming international negotiations must, therefore, be a 
discussion of how countries whose cumulative emis-
sions remain low will be compensated as well as how 
emissions rights for countries with cumulatively high 
emissions will be allocated into the future. Investment in 
clean and renewable energy infrastructures can meet 
many of the economic and social needs of less devel-
oped countries, but they must be brought online as rap-
idly as possible. Such massive investments of funds and 
resources, however, will require the full support―in 
terms of both capital and technology―of developed 
countries, which must recognize that these investments 
will not only be environmentally efficacious but will 
also provide them with a chance to recompense for the 
high levels of emissions that they have produced in the 
past and that they will continue to produce into the fore-
seeable future. 
 














emission value (BUS$) 
1900―2050 total 
value (BUS$) 
Canada 3291.24  6422.75  3131.51  229.64  304.57  534.21  
France 7144.54  7759.95  615.41  45.13  189.86  234.99  
Germany 10313.32  19857.93  9544.61  699.94  479.78  1179.72  
Italy  7126.45  4804.43  −2322.02  −170.28  212.54  42.26  
Japan 14545.50  12526.50  −2019.00  −148.06  696.95  548.89  
Russia 17501.67  21944.47  4442.80  325.81  851.79  1177.59  
UK  7389.81  15097.08  7707.27  565.20  291.29  856.49  
US 31629.63  85920.32  54290.69  3981.32  3272.64  7253.96  
Total 98942.16 174333.43  75391.27  5528.70 6299.42  11828.11  
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 7.6  What commitments should different countries 
make?  
At present, some developed countries are proposing that 
developing countries should make commitments for 
emissions reductions in future international agreements; 
developing countries, conversely, believe that doing so 
is inconsistent with the “common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities” principle and have rejected this proposal. 
Given the long-term objectives of establishing a global 
system of responsibility to cope with climate change, the 
proposed requirements for each country to make com-
mitments are actually reasonable and constructive. 
Nonetheless, a difficulty remains of making certain that 
these commitments reflect the “common but differenti-
ated responsibilities” principle. We believe that setting 
clear national emissions allowances will provide a 
guideline for overcoming this difficulty.  
The timeline in Figure 6 indicates exactly when sev-
eral large representative countries reached their emis-
sions allocations per capita (79.58 + 53.55 = 133.13 tC) 
based on cumulative emissions per capita as an index 
under the 470 ppmv target. The US, the UK, Germany, 
Canada, Australia, and France reached their emissions 
limits by the years 1936, 1945, 1963, 1955, 1977, and 
1989, respectively. The years when Japan, Italy, China,  
and India are expected to reach their limits (2013, 2040, 
2047, and after 2050, respectively) are also shown. 
Points on this timeline correlate directly with historical 
levels of development. 
 
Figure 6  Timeline indicating when several developed countries reached 
and when several developing countries will reach their cumulative emis-
sions per capita under the 470 ppmv target. 
 
In Table 10, a comparison of cumulative emissions 
and projected emissions between G8 countries and eight 
large developing countries is illustrated. In 2005, the 
population of the G8 accounted for only 13.30% of 
global population, while the eight large developing 
countries accounted for 52.45% of total population. This 
 
Table 10  Comparison of emissions between G8 countries and developing countries with large populations 














emissions per capita 
1900―2050 (tC)
G8 countries 
US 299.85 85920.32 467.88 44626.95 148.83 616.71 
Russia 143.95 21944.47 164.00 11615.31 80.69 244.69 
Japan 127.90 12526.50 115.10 9503.84 74.31 189.41 
Germany 82.65 19857.93 271.32 6542.48 79.16 350.48 
France 60.99 7759.95 161.85 2589.02 42.45 204.30 
UK  60.25 15097.08 303.13 3972.09 65.93 369.06 
Italy  58.65 4804.43 88.95 2898.28 49.42 138.37 
Canada 32.27 6422.75 335.80 4153.19 128.70 464.50 
Total 866.50 174333.43  85901.16   
Proportion (%) 13.30  58.85   20.56   
Developing countries 
China 1312.98 25711.80 24.14 109906.51 83.71 107.85 
India 1134.40  7770.59 10.79 54284.52 47.85 58.64 
Indonesia 226.06  1844.23 11.30 20029.13 88.60 99.90 
Brazil 186.83  2405.88 20.27 8483.78 45.41 65.68 
Pakistan 158.08   637.39 5.95 5908.63 37.38 43.33 
Bangladesh 153.28  199.84 2.09 2452.23 16.00 18.09 
Nigeria 141.36  623.18 7.69 11660.26 82.49 90.18 
Mexico 104.27 3408.52 51.26 6327.88 60.69 111.95 
Total 3417.26 42601.43  219052.94   
Proportion (%) 52.45   14.38   52.43     
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 disparity is reversed when cumulative CO2 emissions are 
analyzed: Total emissions from 1900 to 2005 in G8 
countries accounted for 58.85% of global emissions, 
while the total for the eight developing countries with 
large populations was only 14.38%. From 2006 to 2050, 
these eight developing countries are expected to reach 
levels of emissions that are more proportional to their 
populations. Emissions of G8 countries, however, are 
still expected to be disproportional to their populations. 
Figure 6 and Table 10 provide quantitative bases to 
the question, “what commitments should be made by 
developed and developing countries in establishing a 
global system of responsibility?” For developed coun-
tries, commitments should include at least the following 
three terms: 1) a means to recompense for excessive past 
emissions; 2) establishment of a market for trading 
emissions allowances from low-emission countries in 
the future; and 3) a process for rapidly reducing CO2 
emissions in the future. For developing countries, on the 
other hand, four terms can be considered when making 
commitments: 1) the control of cumulative emissions 
per capita by 2050 at the average level reached in 2000 
by currently developed countries and the control of 
emissions within the proper allowance; 2) firm targets 
for both emission intensity per unit GDP and peak per 
capita emissions limits; 3) establishment of a carbon 
market to trade emissions and provisions for market en-
try of carbon sequestration projects from countries with 
excessive emissions and advanced technologies; and 4) 
achievement of carbon sequestration targets through 
changes in land use. 
7.7  Are carbon taxes a reasonable means for regu-
lation? 
Several developed countries are now proposing a carbon 
tax. They believe that for developed countries first to 
reduce their emissions while developing countries take 
no actions is unfair; carbon taxes are intended to provide 
greater balance, especially in the short term. Actually, 
this reasoning makes little sense. First, as discussed pre-
viously, because of the great differences in emissions 
between countries, international accords should be based 
on emissions allowances, not on emissions reductions. If 
carbon taxes are intended as measures of eligibility, then 
only those who ensure their emissions are under their 
allowance could be eligible, while countries with emis-
sions over the allowance would not be. Second, emis-
sions from developing countries are typically a matter of 
survival, while a large proportion of emissions from de-
veloped countries result from consumer lifestyles. Once 
developed countries impose carbon taxes, developing 
countries will certainly take countermeasures, such as 
imposing high tariffs on the luxury products and services 
that are now often produced in the developed world. 
This could trigger a trade war and ultimately harm the 
interests of consumers worldwide. For these reasons, 
carbon taxes should not be considered in the forthcom-
ing climate negotiations.  
7.8  Is “climate migration” really an issue? 
One intention of this paper has been to demonstrate that 
controlling atmospheric CO2 concentrations at the 470 
ppmv level by 2050 will be rather difficult; here, we 
estimate the probable level of global CO2 concentrations 
by that date. Our analysis indicates that this estimate is 
difficult to calculate quantitatively because, beyond cur-
rent trends, actual increases in populations, levels of 
industrialization, and developments of energy infra-
structures in different countries across the world are dif-
ficult to predict. By developing and implementing new 
technologies, for example, the US could reduce its emis-
sions by 83% between 2005 and 2050; in doing so, its 
per capita emissions would be 0.89 tC, according to 
population data in 2005. If the population of the US in-
creases by 20%, however, then its per capita emission 
will drop to 0.71 tC. Such a drop will be difficult for 
developing countries to duplicate because basic indus-
trial and urban infrastructures in these countries, which 
are currently rather minimal, will increase significantly 
with development, so most of them will see their emis-
sions peak only in the years to come.  
Even if these countries could achieve a 0.71 tC per 
capita emissions level, the fact is that annual CO2 emis-
sions into the atmosphere at that level would still be 6.39 
GtC (with the global populations reaching 9 billion); 
therefore, atmospheric CO2 concentrations are still pro-
jected to increase by 1.71 ppmv every year, which is 
about 85% of the current growth rate. Thus, the cruel 
reality is that the era of near-zero emissions remains far 
off.  
Because greenhouse gas emissions will continue to 
result in increased temperatures, more rapid melting of 
sea and continental ice, more extensive sea-level rise, 
and more frequent flooding both of low-lying coastal 
areas and of island chains, the probability of increased 
climate migrations should be considered a serious issue 
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 in the international negotiations. Long-term strategies to 
cope with such migration must be developed. 
7.9  Should carbon sequestration be used to offset 
emissions? 
Theoretically, carbon sequestration should be considered 
in calculating emissions offsets, particularly when CO2 
emissions allowances are the basis for the international 
system of responsibility; however, difficulty lies in 
quantitatively verifying both biosphere and engineering 
figures in determining the effects of sequestration. When 
emissions allowances for each country are established, 
those allowances will become commercial assets and 
could even be considered scarce resources under the 470 
ppmv target. As a result, these allowances will play a 
key role in determining how the “measurable, reportable 
and testable” requirements for both operating sequestra-
tion and controlling emissions allowances are to be met. 
During future international negotiations, creating a spe-
cial working group to study this issue and to set standard 
methods for measuring sequestered carbon will be nec-
essary. 
Each of the nine key issues discussed above should be 
addressed in turn at the forthcoming international nego-
tiations in Denmark. Through these analyses, we find 
that internationally coordinated actions to control  
greenhouse gas emissions will have a profound impact 
on human values as a whole. For instance, many western 
countries have in the past criticized other countries for 
introducing policies like China’s limitations on family 
size; now, however, these countries are beginning to re-
alize that controlling population growth rates is a neces-
sary and logical response to climate change. Further-
more, evaluated in terms of atmospheric greenhouse 
gases concentrations, the lifestyles that many citizens in 
western countries have been pleased to pursue for dec-
ades are fundamentally toxic, having led to the high per 
capita emissions that are jeopardizing the future propa-
gation of societies around the world, including their own. 
These lifestyles should neither be sustained by those in 
the developed world nor aspired to by citizens of devel-
oping countries. As this article has intimated, many 
other issues beyond the allocation of emissions allow-
ances need to be discussed in establishing a system of 
international responsibility that both controls atmos-
pheric CO2 concentrations and deftly conducts interna-
tional relations. Further research on effectively achiev-
ing both outcomes is required in the future. 
We are highly indebted to Gregory Pierce, Bill Isherwood, Dai Junhu, Ye 
Qian, Wang Fang, Ha Yanmei, Zhang Xuezhen, Wang Mengmai for gen-
erous helps in preparation of this manuscript.
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